Over EPA limit: Cesium levels in San Francisco area milk now higher than 6 months ago


Title: UCB Milk Sampling Results
Source: University of California Berkeley Department of Nuclear Engineering
Date: 1/14/2012 (9:40am)

By integrating all of the milk data we have collected since March 11, we can estimate the total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) one could have received from exposure to fission product isotopes in milk to date. For someone drinking milk at the relatively high rate of one gallon per week, the TEDE could be nearly 1 microsievert, or the total effective dose equivalent for only 12 minutes on an airplane flight or 3.7 hours of the average person’s background exposure from natural sources of radiation.

Pasteurized, Homogenized Milk from the San Francisco Bay Area with Best By Date of 12/29/2011

* Cs-134: 0.068 Becquerels/liter (Bq/l) ±0.011 [MDA=0.044]
* Cs-137: 0.075 Bq/l ±0.015 [MDA=0.052]

Total cesium is .143 Bq/l, or 3.87 picocuries/l (pCi/l) (1 Bq = 27.1 pCi).

The EPA Maximum Contaminant Level for radioactive cesium in milk is 3 pCi/l:

“EPA lumps these gamma and beta emitters together under one collective MCL [Maximum Contaminant Level], so if you’re seeing cesium-137 in your milk or water, the MCL is 3.0 picocuries per liter; if you’re seeing iodine-131, the MCL is 3.0; if you’re seeing cesium-137 and iodine-131, the MCL is still 3.0.” -Forbes.com

Current levels are about 40% higher than what was detected 6 months ago:

Pasteurized, Homogenized Milk from the San Francisco Bay Area with Best By Date of 8/22/2011

* Cs-134: 0.047 Bq/l ±0.010 [MDA=0.041]
* Cs-137: 0.052 Bq/l ±0.013 [MDA=0.044]

http://enenews.com/over-epa...er-than-6-months-ago

Panel Challenges Japan’s Account of Nuclear Disaster
By HIROKO TABUCHI
Published: January 15, 2012


TOKYO — A powerful and independent panel of specialists appointed by Japan’s Parliament is challenging the government’s account of the accident at a Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, and will start its own investigation into the disaster — including an inquiry into how much the March earthquake may have damaged the plant’s reactors even before the tsunami.
Amit Bhargava/Bloomberg News

Kiyoshi Kurokawa, who leads the inquiry, vowed that it would have no sacred cows.

The bipartisan panel with powers of subpoena is part of Japan’s efforts to investigate the nuclear calamity, which has displaced more than 100,000 people, rendered wide swaths of land unusable for decades and spurred public criticism that the government has been more interested in protecting vested industry interests than in discovering how three reactors were allowed to melt down and release huge amounts of radiation.

Several investigations — including inquiries by the plant operator, Tokyo Electric Power, and the government — have blamed the scale of the tsunami that struck Japan’s northeastern coast in March, knocking out vital cooling systems at the plant.

But critics in Japan and overseas have called for a fuller accounting of whether Tokyo Electric Power, or Tepco, sufficiently considered historically documented tsunami risks, and whether it could have done more to minimize the damage once waves hit the plant.

Questions also linger as to the extent of damage to the plant caused by the earthquake even before the tsunami hit. Any evidence of serious quake damage at the plant would cast new doubt on the safety of other reactors in quake-prone Japan. Tsunamis are far less frequent.

In his first interview since the panel was appointed last month, Kiyoshi Kurokawa, chairman of the new Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, said his investigation would have no sacred cows.

Mr. Kurokawa, a former leader of Tokyo University’s medical department and a professor at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, has lined up a prominent team, including the Nobel laureate Koichi Tanaka. The committee will have its first full meeting on Monday.

“For Japan to regain global credibility, we need an investigation into the disaster that is completely independent,” Mr. Kurokawa said. He said he was aware of questions raised about quake damage to the plant, and that the committee “would investigate that issue vigorously.”

“The lessons Japan can learn are globally relevant, because such a disaster can happen again,” he said.

Mr. Kurokawa’s committee has garnered attention because some members have been openly critical of Japan’s nuclear policy, including Katsuhiko Ishibashi, a seismologist who has long warned of the risks Japan’s volatile geology poses to its 54 nuclear reactors.

The panel includes Mitsuhiko Tanaka, a former nuclear engineer at Babcock Hitachi who has argued that the quake was likely to have damaged reactors at the plant to the extent that meltdowns would have occurred without the tsunami. Tepco disputes that view. Mr. Tanaka worked on the design of the reactors.

The panel is also the first such group of outside specialists to be named by Japan’s Parliament, supported by members of the ruling Democratic Party and its main opposition, the Liberal Democratic Party.

“If the panel can truly distance itself from political pressure, then it could be a powerful exercise,” said Yoichi Tao, a visiting professor in physics at Kogakuin University who has been working with Fukushima residents to clean up the radioactive fallout. “They must make sure that having bipartisan support does not mean they have to listen to everyone.”
A version of this article appeared in print on January 16, 2012, on page B3 of the New York edition with the headline: Independent Panel Challenges Japan’s Account of Disaster at Nuclear Plant.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012...ear-crisis.html?_r=2

[This message has been edited by dennis_6 (edited 01-16-2012).]

Japan 'betrayed citizens' over radiation danger

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By North Asia correspondent Mark Willacy

Updated January 19, 2012 09:52:57

Officials check for signs of radiation on children after the March 2011 disaster

* Related Story: Japan delayed release of radiation details
* Related Story: Report finds mistakes in Fukushima response
* Map: Japan

Japan has been accused of betraying its own people by giving the American military information about the spread of radiation from Fukushima more than a week before it told the Japanese public.

The mayor of a Japanese community abandoned because of its proximity to the Fukushima nuclear plant has told AM the government's actions are akin to murder.

An official from Japan's science ministry, which was in charge of mapping the spread of radiation, has acknowledged to AM that perhaps the public should have been told about the dangers at the same time the US military was informed.

In the hours after the meltdowns at Fukushima, unseen plumes of radiation began to roll over the Japanese landscape.

Just a few kilometres from the oozing remains of the nuclear plant the people of Namie village gathered to evacuate.

With no information coming from Tokyo, mayor Tamotsu Baba decided to lead the people of his community further north away from the plant.

He did not know it at the time, but that was the very direction the plumes of radiation were also blowing.

"Because we had no information, we were unwittingly evacuating to an area where the radiation level was high. So I'm very worried about the people's health," he told AM.

"I feel pain in my heart but also rage over the poor actions of the government."

While the people of Namie and the Japanese public as a whole were not getting any clear idea from their government about the possible spread of radiation, the Americans were.

Just three days after the tsunami crushed the Fukushima nuclear plant, Japan's science ministry handed over computer predictions about the radiation dispersal to the US military.

Itaru Watanabe from the science ministry says the government did this to secure US support in dealing with the nuclear crisis.

But he admits that maybe that same data should have been shared with the public too.

"According to the government panel investigating the disaster, the information about the potential spread of radiation could have been given to the public," he said.

"The science ministry should have told the nuclear disaster task force to pass on the data to the people. But we didn't think of that. We acknowledge that now."
'Act of murder'

Mr Baba, who is now homeless, accuses the Japanese authorities of abandoning his village by withholding information and leaving his community at the mercy of unseen radiation.

"It's not nice language, but I still think it was an act of murder," he said.

"What were they thinking when it came to people's dignity and lives? I doubt that they even thought about our existence."

It is true Japan's science ministry struggled to glean accurate information about the amount of radiation spewing from the Fukushima plant, with some data about its spread proving wide of the mark.

Mr Watanabe acknowledges whatever data was available should have been passed on to the public.

"We acknowledge the criticism that if the data was publicly known that people could have avoided areas of high contamination. So we will study what's happened to see how we can use the system more effectively," he said.

For the 20,000 people of Namie that probably does not mean much - they have lost their homes and many fear for the health of their children.

A system that was designed to protect and warn them has clearly failed.

http://www.abc.net.au/news/...82110/?site=ballarat

Result of endoscope operation on 1/19/2012
Posted by Mochizuki on January 19th, 2012 · No Comments

The water level turned out to be lower then 4.000m at the most.

Even the radiation resistant endoscope for 1000Sv got too much noise.

Tepco inserted 2m of the endoscope to reactor2 from the hole called X53 on 1/19/2012. The operation took 6 Tepco employees and 28 workers from subcontract companies. The maximum dose of the worker was 3.07 mSv.

As the result, they could not see the water surface. Because the radiation level was too high, endoscope had too much noise to capture the clear image.

The heat gauge on the endoscope measured 44.7℃ at 9:13. The heat gauge set inside of around X53 measured 42.6℃, so Tepco judged the heat gauges inside are not completely broken.

Unexpectedly, inside was not too steamy but because the evaporated water kept dropping inside, it also prevented the camera from capturing clear image.

The coating inside of the reactor was damaged and ripped off like squama.

From the gap of the pressure between inside of the reactor and suppression chamber, Tepco assumed the water level could be above the grating cover, but they could not see the water at least above the cover.

The height of the cover is around 4.0m from the bottom of the reactor. At least the water level is lower than there.



Actual Fukushima worker analyzes the main problem is the extremely high level of radiation.

@Happy20790
ハッピー
ただいまっ(^O^)今日は手足先の寒さも感じないで仕事出来たでし。2号機PCVの中見えたね。オイラが思ってたよりよく見えてた。もっとｸﾓｸﾓで見えないと思ってたからね。今日は水面まで� ��れなかったのは残念だけど、中が見れただけでも良かったと思う。ただ気になるのは線量なんだ。

<Translation>

I’m back Today was warm, didn’t feel icy in my hands and feet. We managed to see inside of the PCV of reactor2. The image was clearer than I thought. I thought the inside might be more steamy. That’s sad not to be able to see the water surface, but it was an improvement for sure. but I’m concerned about the radiation level.

<End>



Happy20790 ハッピー
続き1:今日使ったカメラが確か1000SVの耐放カメラだと思うんだけど、かなりノイズ出てたから中は相当線量高い感じがするんだよね。通常の定検中も炉内に水中カメラ入れるんだけど線量の� �い上部格子板（ﾄｯﾌﾟｶﾞｲﾄﾞ）に近づいたらノイズが凄いんだ。

<Translation>

The camera we used today can resist for 1000Sv, but even the camera got so much noise (the white spots), the radiation level is really high. At usual reactor test, we put water-resistant camera into the reactor but it gets too much noise when the camera goes close to the highly radioactive place called top guide.

<End>



Happy20790 ハッピー
続き2:余り長い時間見てるとカメラ素子が壊れてしまうんだ。今日のはそんな感じだったからなぁ…。今後詳細に調べるならもっと高性能なカメラが必要だね。だけど燃料ﾃﾞﾌﾞﾘに近づ� �て見れるカラーカメラだと1億円以上するんじゃないのかなぁ…。

<Translation>

If you put the camera at too radioactive place for too long, the camera gets broken. Today the endoscope became like that. To get more detailed image, we would need a more protective camera. It would cost 100 million yen to buy the camera what can get close to the fuel debris with color image.

<End>



Happy20790 ハッピー
続き3:次はちょっと治具を検討開発しなきゃだけど、今回のﾍﾟﾈを使って線量測定して欲しい。線量がわからないと対策も打てないし…。本当はX-6ﾍﾟﾈ付近からカメラが入れられればい� �んだけどね。そしたらCRD昇降ブリッジ伝いにﾍﾟﾃﾞｽﾀﾙ内にアクセス出来るんだけど…。

<Translation>

For the next time, we need to develop new equipment. We shall use the same hole to measure the radiation level next time. We can’t even tell what to do if we don’t know the radiation level inside.

<End>

http://fukushima-diary.com/...28Fukushima+Diary%29

TOKYO-- The first look inside one of Japan's tsunami-hit nuclear reactors showed radiation, steam and rusty metal surfaces scarred by 10 months' exposure to high temperatures and humidity.

The steam-blurred photos taken by remote control Thursday found none of the reactor's melted fuel but confirmed stable reactor temperature and showed no major damage or ruptures caused by the earthquake last March, said Junichi Matsumoto, spokesman for the plant operator, Tokyo Electric Power Co.

Radiation appeared on the images as static, or electronic interference with the equipment being used. Some parts that were photographed inside the reactor's containment vessel are not yet identifiable.

The photos also showed inner wall of the container heavily deteriorated after 10 months of exposure to high temperature and humidity, Matsumoto said.

TEPCO workers inserted the endoscope -- an industrial version of the kind of endoscope doctors use -- through a hole in the beaker-shaped container at the Fukushima Dai-ichi plant's No. 2 reactor, hoping the first look inside since the crisis would help them better assess reactor conditions and make repairs.

High temperatures and radiation leaks had prevented the close-up view until now. Results of the 70-minute operation were mixed.

"Given the harsh environment that we had to operate, we did quite well. It's a first step," Matsumoto said. "But we could not spot any signs of fuel, unfortunately."

He said it would take more time and a better technology to get to the melted fuel, most of which has fallen straight down into the area that the endoscope could not reach. TEPCO hopes to use the endoscope to look inside the two other reactors that had meltdowns but that also would require customization of the equipment and further reduction of radiation levels.

Better assessment will help workers know how best to plug holes and cracks in the containment vessel -- a protective chamber outside the core -- to contain radiation leaks and gradually work toward dismantling the reactors.

Three of six reactors at the Fukushima plant melted down after the March 11 earthquake and tsunami knocked out the plant's cooling systems and set off the world's worst nuclear accident since Chernobyl.

TEPCO and nuclear officials have said that melted fuel probably fell to the bottom of the core in each unit, most likely breaching the bottom of the core and falling into the primary containment vessel, some dropping to its concrete floor.

Experts have said those are simulation results and that exact location and condition of the fuel could not be known until they have a first-hand observation inside.

The probe Thursday successfully recorded the temperature inside the containment vessel at 112 F, confirming it stayed below the boiling point and qualifying a "cold shutdown state," the stable condition that the government had declared in December despite skepticism from experts.

The probe failed to find the water surface, which indicate the water sits at lower-than-expected levels inside the primary containment vessel and questions the accuracy of the current water monitors, Matsumoto said.

The government has said that it would take 40 years until the Fukushima plant is fully decommissioned.

Read more: http://www.foxnews.com/worl...actor/#ixzz1jw1iDM52

[This message has been edited by dennis_6 (edited 01-19-2012).]

Not quite the chirpy picture you were painting phonedawgz, They didn't find the fuel, and they didn't find any water. Granted, they couldn't see all the way to the bottom of the reactor, due to extremely high radiation. The assumption that the rods had adequate cooling from pumping water over them may very well have been false.

Water falling like rain inside N-reactor

The Yomiuri Shimbun

Tokyo Electric Power Co. on Friday released 30 minutes of video footage taken Thursday inside the containment vessel of the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant's No. 2 reactor, the first such images to be released by the utility.

Drops of water fall like rain in the video, which was shot using an industrial endoscope. The drops were apparently the result of vapor--created by the heat from melted nuclear fuel--that cooled inside the upper part of the reactor containment vessel.

Strong radiation caused scattered white static in the footage, which displayed the severe environment inside the containment vessel, observers said.

The vessel's pipes did not appear to be significantly damaged, but paint had fallen off the inner wall, due possibly to high temperatures following the outbreak of the nuclear crisis.

The endoscope was inserted about two meters into the containment vessel through a hole about seven meters above the bottom of the containment vessel. Visibility was about two meters to three meters.

Melted nuclear fuel is believed to have fallen to the concrete bottom of the containment vessel, but this could not be confirmed.

"Workers can't go into the containment vessel. We need to develop a small robot," said Junichi Matsumoto, acting head of TEPCO's headquarters regarding nuclear plant locations.

Also, the water level inside the reactor was found to be lower than initially estimated. Although TEPCO believed water had collected to a height of 4.5 meters, the examination showed the water height was apparently less than four meters, as the surface of the water was not seen around the iron scaffolding set at a height of four meters.

As one reason why there was less water than TEPCO estimated, the company said the gauge that measures the location of the water's surface did not work accurately.

However, the gauge placed 2.8 meters from the bottom of the vessel indicated a possibility there is water at that level, TEPCO sources said.

"It's quite unlikely nuclear fuel was exposed, as liquid from condensation is dripping down," a TEPCO official said.
(Jan. 21, 2012)
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy...al/T120120006919.htm

TEPCO urged to compensate for tainted building material in Fukushima
Parents of students at Asahi Elementary School in Nihonmatsu, Fukushima Prefecture, attend a meeting at the school on the evening of Jan. 17. (Mainichi)
Parents of students at Asahi Elementary School in Nihonmatsu, Fukushima Prefecture, attend a meeting at the school on the evening of Jan. 17. (Mainichi)

TOKYO (Kyodo) -- Industry minister Yukio Edano on Friday promised the mayor of a city where crushed stone believed to be contaminated due to the Fukushima nuclear crisis was used for some buildings that he will instruct Tokyo Electric Power Co. to pay compensation for related damage.

Edano made the remark during a meeting in Tokyo with Keiichi Miho, mayor of the city of Nihonmatsu in Fukushima Prefecture, after the mayor called on the central government to ensure the payment of compensation for related damage and set up a radiation yardstick for building materials.

The meeting followed the detection of a high level of radiation in a condominium in Nihonmatsu, the foundation of which was made using concrete containing crushed stone collected from a quarry inside the evacuation zone near the utility's crippled Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant.

Gravel and crushed stone from the quarry in Namie, Fukushima Prefecture, were also found to have been used to reinforce the earthquake resistance of an elementary school building and in the yard of a home in the city.

Miho said in a petition, "We request that all losses that relevant parties incurred, including the moving costs of residents, be compensated for under the responsibility of the state and Tokyo Electric."

Edano responded that he will instruct the utility known as TEPCO to begin compensation procedures immediately. As for the mayor's request for a radiation yardstick for the shipment of building materials, Edano said the government needs to consider the matter further.

TEPCO spokesman Junichi Matsumoto admitted later at a press conference that the high radiation level detected at the condominium was likely due to radioactive substances released from the crippled power complex.

"We intend to deal with the matter appropriately based on the outcome of research on how the condominium was constructed," he said.

The gravel used was shipped from the quarry sometime between the beginning of the nuclear plant crisis, which was triggered by the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami, and the government's designation of the evacuation zone on April 22.

Crushed stone from the quarry may have been used in more than 1,000 locations in the prefecture and the government is investigating distribution routes.
The quarry in Namie, Fukushima Prefecture, that shipped highly radioactive crushed stone used in construction projects in the prefecture is seen on Jan. 6. (Mainichi)
The quarry in Namie, Fukushima Prefecture, that shipped highly radioactive crushed stone used in construction projects in the prefecture is seen on Jan. 6. (Mainichi)

Miho also made similar requests to reconstruction minister Tatsuo Hirano and land minister Takeshi Maeda.

Meanwhile, in the town of Namie, around 10 officials from the Environment Ministry, the Japan Atomic Energy Agency and the Fukushima prefectural government conducted on-site research at the quarry, 26 kilometers northwest of the crippled power complex.

Wearing protective gear, officials measured airborne radiation levels, detecting up to 40 microsieverts per hour of radiation. They took some samples of stones to check contamination levels in detail.

The Fukushima prefectural government plans to conduct on-site research at 25 quarries and 3 gravel pits in the evacuation zone and other locations with high radiation levels.

(Mainichi Japan) January 20, 2012
http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnn...2g00m0dm177000c.html

By MARTIN FACKLER
Published: January 21, 2012


Onami sits just 35 miles northwest of the wrecked Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant, which spewed radioactive cesium that has impacted rice farms.

Onami sits just 35 miles northwest of the wrecked Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant, which spewed radioactive cesium over much of this rural region last March. However, the government inspectors declared Onami’s rice safe for consumption after testing just two of its 154 rice farms.

Then, a few days later, a skeptical farmer in Onami, who wanted to be sure his rice was safe for a visiting grandson, had his crop tested, only to find it contained levels of cesium that exceeded the government’s safety limit. In the weeks that followed, more than a dozen other farmers also found unsafe levels of cesium. An ensuing panic forced the Japanese government to intervene, with promises to test more than 25,000 rice farms in eastern Fukushima Prefecture, where the plant is located.

The uproar underscores how, almost a year after a huge earthquake and tsunami caused a triple meltdown at the Fukushima Daiichi plant, Japan is still struggling to protect its food supply from radioactive contamination. The discovery of tainted rice in Onami and a similar case in July involving contaminated beef have left officials scrambling to plug the exposed gaps in the government’s food-screening measures, many of which were hastily introduced after the accident.

The repeated failures have done more than raise concerns that some Japanese may have been exposed to unsafe levels of radiation in their food, as regrettable as that is. They have also had a corrosive effect on public confidence in the food-monitoring efforts, with a growing segment of the public and even many experts coming to believe that officials have understated or even covered up the true extent of the public health risk in order to limit both the economic damage and the size of potential compensation payments.

Critics say farm and health officials have been too quick to allow food to go to market without adequate testing, or have ignored calls from consumers to fully disclose test results. And they say the government can no longer pull the wool over the public’s eyes, as they contend it has done routinely in the past.

“Since the accident, the government has tried to continue its business-as-usual approach of understating the severity of the accident and insisting that it knows best,” said Mitsuhiro Fukao, an economics professor at Keio University in Tokyo who has written about the loss of trust in government. “But the people are learning from the blogs, Twitter and Facebook that the government’s food-monitoring system is simply not credible.”

One result has been a burst of civic activism, rare in a nation with a weak civil society that depends on its elite bureaucrats more than citizen groups to safeguard the national interests, including public health. No longer confident that government is looking out for their interests, newly formed groups of consumers and even farmers are beginning their own radiation-monitoring efforts.

More than a dozen radiation-testing stations, mostly operated by volunteers, have appeared across Fukushima and as far south as Tokyo, 150 miles from the plant, aiming to offer radiation monitoring that is more stringent and transparent than that of the government.

“No one trusts the national government’s safety standards,” said Ichio Muto, 59, who farms organic mushrooms in Nihonmatsu, 25 miles northwest of the Fukushima Daiichi plant. “The only way to win back customers is to tell them everything, so they can decide for themselves what to buy.”

Mr. Muto is one of 250 farmers in Nihonmatsu who started a makeshift radiation-testing center at a local truck stop. On a recent morning, he and a half-dozen other farmers gathered in the truck stop’s tiny kitchen. There, they diced daikon, leeks and other produce before putting them separately into a $40,000 testing device that was donated by a nongovernmental group.

The farmers test samples of every crop they grow, and then they post the results on the Internet for all to see. Mr. Muto knows firsthand how painful such full disclosure can be: he destroyed his entire crop of 110,000 mushrooms after tests revealed high radiation levels.

But such efforts do not address one of the biggest questions asked by consumers: whether farming should be allowed at all in areas near the plant.

Farmers like Mr. Muto say they have no choice because they have seen little if any compensation and must make a living. So far, Fukushima Daiichi’s operator, Tokyo Electric Power, has offered full compensation only to farmers in the zones that were evacuated, which were within 12 miles of the plant, and a larger area to the northwest, where winds carried much of the fallout.

That approach is in line with the government’s basic stance since the accident: limiting as much as possible the size of the land area affected in this densely populated nation. Officials admit that many people question the wisdom of allowing farms so near the plant to operate, but they say that once they stop farming in an area because of radiation, it will take years to persuade the public to allow them to start again.

“Consumers might think the best choice is not to farm here, or just throw the food away, but producers see it differently,” said Wataru Amano, chief of the rice section of the Fukushima prefectural government.

However, farmers in Onami have a different view. Even before the discovery of tainted rice in November, they said, the government’s policy had left them no choice but to keep farming. Now, they said, they face economic ruin because no one will buy their rice.

“This happened because those up above did not want to pay compensation,” said a 74-year-old rice farmer, who gave only her surname, Sato, for fear that further association with radiation could spell the end of her farm, which has been in the family for six generations. “We did what they told us to do, and now we are being wiped out.”

Farming officials say they have too few radiation-detecting machines to test every product from every farm; there are only a few dozen machines in all of Fukushima Prefecture, a region about the size of Connecticut, with 110,000 farms. However, they acknowledge that random sampling has proved inadequate because the explosions at the plant spread radioactive particles unevenly across communities, creating small “hot spots” of high radioactivity.

Prefectural officials say that since the discovery of tainted rice, they have tested rice from 4,975 farms in Onami and 21 other communities mostly in the relatively contaminated areas to the northwest of the plant. They said the rice from about one-fifth of those farms contained cesium, though most of it at low levels. Only 30 farms exceeded Japan’s current safety level for radiation in food.

However, almost 300 farms had rice that would exceed a new, tougher safety level that the Health Ministry is to adopt in April, bringing Japan in line with most developed countries. “We must regain public trust by putting together a new screening system as quickly as possible,” Mr. Amano said.

Still, farming officials have so far resisted removing what many consumers say is the biggest hurdle to regaining their trust: the lack of transparency in the government’s radiation testing. Many consumers complain that the results of radiation tests are kept intentionally vague so consumers cannot tell exactly where the readings come from.

Agricultural officials and many farmers fear that revealing more detailed results would scare away consumers, who might be spooked by even low levels of radiation. “We hear the calls for more disclosure, but revealing more detailed data would just hurt too many farmers,” said Osamu Yoshioka, a food safety official at the Ministry of Agriculture.

That view was disputed by shoppers at Vegetable Cafe Harmonize, a small grocery store here that sells produce only from western Japan, far from the nuclear plant. One shopper was Junko Kohata, a 42-year-old real estate agent who said she avoided all Fukushima-grown produce because the government only reveals whether it is above or below the permissible level.

“I’d rather buy local, but I have no choice but to protect myself,” Ms. Kohata said. The store was opened two months ago by the Network of Parents to Protect Children from Radiation, known here as Mamorukai, which was started by a few dozen concerned parents after the accident. In nine months, it has grown into a nationwide network with 200 chapters.

“If the government treated us like adults, there would be no need for Mamorukai,” said Sachiko Sato, a network founder. “Japan must build an entirely new food-monitoring system that we average people can really trust.”

Makiko Inoue contributed reporting.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012...?_r=2&pagewanted=all

TEPCO Notes Rise in Radioactive Leaks from Damaged Reactors

Tokyo, Jan. 23 (Jiji Press)--Tokyo Electric Power Co. <9501> on Monday reported an increase in radioactive materials leaking from damaged nuclear reactors at the Fukushima No. 1 power plant.
The total amount of radioactive cesium that leaked from the containment vessels of the No. 1 to No. 3 reactors reached 70 million becquerels per hour, up 12 million becquerels from the December level, the power firm said.
It seems that radioactive dusts were stirred up because plant workers went inside reactor buildings and removed rubble, TEPCO officials said.
The outcome was reported to the second meeting on medium- to long-term measures toward decommissioning of the damaged reactors held between the firm and the government on Monday.
Last month, the leaked amount was put at 10 million becquerels each for the No. 1 and No. 2 reactors and 40 million becquerels for the No. 3 reactor.
http://jen.jiji.com/jc/eng?g=eco&k=2012012300780

quote Originally posted by phonedawgz: http://enenews.com/pbs-fron...rt-very-conservative http://video.pbs.org/program/frontline/

Aftershocking: Frontline’s Fukushima Documentary a Lazy Apologia for the Nuclear Industry
Monday 23 January 2011
by: Gregg Levine, Capitoilette | Op-Ed

There is much to say about this week’s Frontline documentary, “Nuclear Aftershocks,” and some of it would even be good. For the casual follower of nuclear news in the ten months since an earthquake and tsunami triggered the massive and ongoing disaster at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station, it is illuminating to see the wreckage that once was a trio of active nuclear reactors, and the devastation and desolation that has replaced town after town inside the 20-kilometer evacuation zone. And it is eye-opening to experience at ground level the inadequacy of the Indian Point nuclear plant evacuation plan. It is also helpful to learn that citizens in Japan and Germany have seen enough and are demanding their countries phase out nuclear energy.

But if you are only a casual observer of this particular segment of the news, then theFrontline broadcast also left you with a mountain of misinformation and big bowl-full of unquestioned bias.

Take, for example, Frontline correspondent Miles O’Brien’s cavalier treatment of the potential increase in Japanese cancer deaths, courtesy of the former property of the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO):

MILES O’BRIEN: When Japanese authorities set radiation levels for evacuation, they were conservative, 20 millisieverts per year. That’s the equivalent of two or three abdominal CAT scans in the same period. I asked Dr. Gen Suzuki about this.

[on camera] So at 20 millisieverts over the course of a long period of time, what is the increased cancer risk?

GEN SUZUKI, Radiation specialist, Nuclear Safety Comm.: Yeah, it’s 0.2— 0.2 percent increase in lifetime.

MILES O’BRIEN: [on camera] 0.2 percent over the course of a lifetime?

GEN SUZUKI: Yeah.

MILES O’BRIEN: So your normal risk of cancer in Japan is?

GEN SUZUKI: Is 30 percent.

MILES O’BRIEN: So what is the increased cancer rate?

GEN SUZUKI: 30.2 percent, so the increment is quite small.

MILES O’BRIEN: And yet the fear is quite high.

GEN SUZUKI: Yes, that’s true.

MILES O’BRIEN: [voice-over] People are even concerned here, in Fukushima City, outside the evacuation zone, where radiation contamination is officially below any danger level.

There was no countervailing opinion offered after this segment–which is kind of disgraceful because there is a myriad of informed, countervailing opinions out there.

Is 20 millisieverts (mSv) a year a conservative limit on exposure? Well, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission says the average annual dose for those living in the United Statesis 6.2 mSv, half of which is background, with the other half expected to come from diagnostic medical procedures. And according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the maximum additional dose for an adult before it is considered an “unacceptable risk” is one millisievert per year.

Then, to assess the cancer risk, O’Brien, practically in the same breath, changes exposure over a single year to “over the course of a long period of time”–an inexcusable muddying of the facts. One year for those who must live out their lives in northern Japan might wind up seeming like a long period of time, but it would actually be a small fraction of their lifetimes, and so would present them with only a fraction of their exposure.

So, is Dr. Gen Suzuki assessing the increased cancer risk for 20 mSv over a lifetime, a long time, or just one year? It is hard to say for sure, though, based on his estimates, it seems more like he is using a much longer timeframe than a single year. But even if his estimate really is the total expected increase in cancer deaths from the Fukushima disaster, what is he talking about? Miles O’Brien seems almost incredulous that anyone would be showing concern over a .2 percent increase, but in Japan, a .2 percent increase in cancer deaths means 2,000 more deaths. How many modern nations would find any disaster–natural or manmade–that resulted in 2,000 deaths to be negligible? For that matter, how many of the reporters, producers or crew of Frontline would feel good about rolling the dice and moving their family into an area that expects 2,000 additional fatalities?

Further, the exchange doesn’t say anything about the person who is supposed to casually endure the equivalent of three abdominal CAT scans a year (something no respectable professional would recommend without some very serious cause). The effects of radiation exposure on children are quite a bit different from the effects of the same exposure on adults–and quite a bit more troubling. And young girls are more at risk than young boys. Though the Frontline episode features many pictures of children–for instance, playing little league baseball–it never mentions their higher risks.

Also missing here, any mention that in a country now blanketed north to south in varying levels of radioactive fallout, radiation exposure is not purely external. The estimates discussed above are based on an increase in background radiation, but radioactive isotopes are inhaled with fallout-laden dust and dirt, and consumed with food from contaminated farmlands and fisheries. Outcomes will depend on the isotopes and who consumes them–radioactive Iodine concentrates in the Thyroid and has a half life of a couple of weeks; Cesium 137 tends to gravitate toward muscle and has a half-life of about 30 years. Strontium 90, which concentrates in bones, lasts almost as long. The affect of all of this needs to be factored in to any estimates of post-Fukushima morbidity.

So, as one might imagine, Dr. Suzuki’s cancer estimate, be it from his own deliberate downplay or O’Brien’s sloppy framing, is widely disputed. In fact, a quick survey of the literature might call the estimate in Frontline an absurdly low outlier.

By way of example, take findings compiled by Fairwinds Associates, an engineering and environmental consulting firm often critical of the nuclear industry. Using data from the National Academy of Science’s report on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation (BEIR), Fairwinds explains that one in every 100 girls will develop cancer for every year they are exposed to that “conservative” 20 mSv of radiation. But Fairwinds believes the BEIR also underestimates the risk. Fairwinds introduces additional analysis to show that “at least one out of every 20 young girls (5%) living in an area where the radiological exposure is 20 millisieverts for five years will develop cancer in their lifetime.”

It should be noted here that five years of 20 mSv per year would equal 100 mSv lifetime exposure–the newly revised lifetime maximum set by Japan after the start of the Fukushima nuclear disaster. And some cities in northern Japan, uncomfortable with this blanket prescription, have set limits for children at one millisievert per year.

None of this information was hard to find, and all of it stems from data provided by large, respected institutions, yet, for some reason, O’Brien and Frontline felt content to let their single source set a tone of “no big deal.” Worried Japanese residents featured just after the interview with Dr. Suzuki are portrayed as broadly irrational, if not borderline hysterical.

The dismissive tenor of the medical segment carries over to several other parts of “Nuclear Aftershocks.” Take Frontline’s assessment of the German reaction to the meltdowns at Fukushima Daiichi. Chancellor Angela Merkel’s government has pledged to entirely phase out their reliance on nuclear power within the next decade. O’Brien call this decision “rash” and “hasty,” and he doesn’t qualify those adjectives as the viewpoint of one expert or another; instead, he uses them matter-of-factly, as if everyone knows that Germany is a nation of jittery, irresponsible children. The political reality–that the German government is actually pursuing a policy that is the will of the people–is treated as some sort of abomination.

Japanese anti-nuclear protestors get similar treatment from Frontline. That large demonstrations like those seen over the last ten months are a rare and special occurrence in Japan is not considered. Instead, the documentary, time and again, hints at a shadowy doomsday somewhere in the near future, a sort of end-of-civilization scenario caused by an almost instant cessation of nuclear power generation. Indeed, as the program ends, O’Brien declares that every nuclear plant in Japan will be shut down by May–and as he says this, the camera peers out the window of a slow-moving elevated train. The view is a darkened Japanese city, and as O’Brien finishes his monologue, the train grinds to a halt.

Ooh, skeddy. Was this Frontline, or Monster Chiller Horror Theater?

Yes, the end seemed that absurd. “Nuclear Aftershocks” paints a picture many members of both the nuclear and fossil fuels lobbies would love to have you believe: a sort of zero-sum, vaguely binary, cake-or-death world where every possible future holds only the oldest, dirtiest and most dangerous options for electrical power generation. You get coal, you get gas, or you get nuclear–make up your mind!

But the show, like the handmaidens of those out-dated technologies, perverts the argument by glossing over the present and omitting choices for the future. As much as many concerned citizens would like to see nuclear power disappear overnight, it will not. Germany is giving itself a decade, the US is looking to run its aging reactors for another twenty years, and even Japan, dream though they might, will likely not decommission every reactor in the next four months. There is a window–big or small depending on your point of view–but a decided period of time to shift energy priorities.

Even the nuclear advocates who appear on Frontline call nuclear power “a bridge”–but if their lobby and their fossil fuel-loving brethren have their way, it will likely be a bridge to nowhere.

“Nuclear Aftershocks” does mention Germany’s increased investment in a wind- and solar-powered future, but the show calls that shift “a bold bet” and “a risk.”

Likely the producers will argue they did not have time for a deeper exploration, but by allowing fissile and fossil fuel advocates to argue that renewables cannot meet “base load” requirements, while failing to discuss recent leaps forward in solar and wind technology, or how well Japan’s wind turbines weathered the Tohoku quake and tsunami–or, for that matter, how much Japanese citizens have been able to reduce their electrical consumption since then through basic conservation–Frontline’s creators are guilty of flat-earth-inspired editing.

Indeed, missing from almost every discussion of the future of power generation is how much we could slow the growth in demand through what is called efficiencies–conservation, passive design, changes in construction techniques, and the replacement and upgrading of an aging electric infrastructure. The Frontline documentary highlights some of the potential risks of an accident at New York’s Indian Point nuclear generating station, but it contrasts that concern with nearby New York City’s unquenchable thirst for electricity. Missing entirely from the discussion: that New York could make up for all of Indian Point’s actual output by conserving a modest amount and replacing the transmission lines that bring hydroelectric power from the north with newer, more efficient cable.

No single solution is a panacea for every region of the globe, but many alternatives need to be on the table, and they certainly ought to be in any discussion about the “aftershocks” of nuclear’s annus horribilis. It should be seen as impossible to evaluate nuclear energy without considering the alternatives–and not just the CO2-creating, hydrofracking alternatives that are the standby bugbear of those infatuated with atomic power. Coal, gas, and nuclear are our links to the past; renewables and increased efficiency are our real bridge to the future. Just as it is dishonest to evaluate the cost of any of the old-school energy technologies without also considering environmental impact and enormous government subsidies–and now, too, the costs of relocating hundreds of thousands or millions of people and treating untold numbers of future health problems–it is also misleading to treat energy funds as permanently allocated to entrenched fuels.

The billions pledged to the nuclear industry by the Obama administration dwarf the budgets and tax incentives for conservation, alternative fuels, and green technology innovation combined. Factor in the government-shouldered costs of cleanup and waste storage, not to mention the sweetheart deals granted to the hydrocarbon crowd, and you could put together a program for next-generation generation that would make the Manhattan Project look like an Our Gang play (“My dad has an old barn!” “My mom can sew curtains!”).

It is a grave disappointment that Frontline couldn’t take the same broad view. The producers will no doubt argue that they could only say so much in 50 minutes, but like Japan, Germany, and the United States, they had choices. For the governments of these industrialized nations, the choices involve their energy futures and the safety of their citizens; for the Frontline crew, their choices can either help or hinder those citizens when they need to make informed choices of their own. For all concerned, the time to make those choices is now.

It is a shame that “Nuclear Aftershocks” instead used its time to run interference for a dirty, dangerous and costly industry.
http://www.truth-out.org/af...-industry/1327350800

750 police officers to be assigned to 3 prefectures devastated by March 11 disaster

Crime Jan. 23, 2012 - 06:16AM JST ( 17 )

TOKYO —

The National Police Agency (NPA) will assign 750 police officers to the three tsunami-hit prefectures of Miyagi, Iwate and Fukushima.

The NPA said in a statement that there are not enough officers to patrol the region. There has been an increased in reported thefts, especially in the evacuation zone in Fukushima, the NPA said.

The NPA said it asked for volunteers, who are single, from across the nation. The 750 officers will be stationed in the three prefectures for up to one year, and will live in temporary housing. They will go out on patrols, as well as direct traffic in busy locations where there are no traffic lights.

Japan Today
http://www.japantoday.com/c...by-march-11-disaster

Monday, Jan. 23, 2012

Off-clock radiation exposure ignored
Kyodo

The health ministry is not calculating how much radiation workers at the Fukushima No. 1 power plant absorbed after they evacuated or while off the clock, casting doubt on the adequacy of the current radiation control regime.

The Health, Labor and Welfare Ministry also does not intend to assess radiation exposure for workers engaged in decontamination efforts around the badly damaged plant in Fukushima Prefecture, government officials and supporters of the workers said Saturday.

The ministry currently keeps track of radiation doses when nuclear workers are actually at work. The maximum doses for the workers and those involved in decontamination efforts are 100 millisieverts over five years and 50 millisieverts a year.

The officials said the ministry takes the position that in controlling radiation dosage, it makes a distinction between work and personal life because the measures taken to mitigate exposure differ between them.

"No matter where they are exposed to radiation, it's the same thing for an individual," said Katsuyasu Iida, who works on securing the health of nuclear plant workers as head of the secretariat for the Tokyo Occupational Safety and Health Center.

Noting that the health ministry is developing a database to record radiation doses separately from the one compiled by the Radiation Effects Association, Iida said that by employing such a database, total dosage "should be strictly controlled by adding up doses received when they are not at work."

Those who enter controlled zones at nuclear plants carry a booklet used to keep track of radiation exposure while working. The data are sent to the Radiation Effects Association in Tokyo, which keeps track of the accumulated doses at whatever plants they go to work at and for whatever employer they work for. Those whose radiation doses exceed the limits are barred from further work.

All of the workers at Fukushima No. 1 carry dosimeters while working or moving between the plant and an accident response base nearby. Radiation exposure during evacuations following the accident and while away from work are being projected on the basis of radiation levels at observation points.

In its report last December, the Fukushima Prefectural Government estimated that evacuees from 12 municipalities around the plant were externally exposed to up to 19 millisieverts of radiation over the four months from the start of the disaster, which followed the March 11 megaquake and tsunami.
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20120123a5.html

Bomb survivor doctor continues to speak up about significance of internal exposure
Shuntaro Hida speaks about internal radiation exposure at a lecture on Dec. 12, 2011. (Mainichi)
Shuntaro Hida speaks about internal radiation exposure at a lecture on Dec. 12, 2011. (Mainichi)

"Internal radiation exposure has been around since the Hiroshima/Nagasaki days," said 95-year-old doctor Shuntaro Hida. He has treated over 6,000 patients with bura-bura disease, a kind of fatigue seen among A-bomb survivors, and is himself a survivor of the Hiroshima bombing. His voice carried well inside the Yokohama auditorium where he was giving a lecture titled "The Fukushima No. 1 Nuclear Power Plant Incident and Internal Radiation Exposure."

"People who weren't in Hiroshima or Nagasaki when the bombs fell, but went there a few days later searching for family members died mysteriously," he said. Though Hida usually walks with a cane, his speech was an impassioned one that he gave for two hours on his feet.

Hida was stationed at an army hospital in Hiroshima in 1944. A first lieutenant doctor, he was in the city of Hiroshima's Higashi Ward about 6 kilometers away from the bomb's hypocenter when the bomb was dropped. Before the day was over, he had made numerous trips back and forth from the hypocenter, and later offered emergency medical treatment in the surrounding areas. Because of the sheer number of people who suffered horrendous burns, the mysterious phenomenon of people entering the city after the bombing and dying strange deaths went relatively unnoticed.

One woman arrived in Hiroshima a week after the bombing to look for her husband. After walking the ruins of the city for a week, they were reunited. However, when she was helping to take care of a critically injured patient, she developed a fever and purple spots on her skin. Her hair also fell out, and she vomited blood before she died.

Witnessing such a phenomenon, Hida and his colleagues came up with the concept of "city-entering radiation exposure."

"The term 'internal radiation exposure' didn't exist at the time," Hida said. "Because these people entered the city and were exposed to radiation, we called it ' city-entering radiation exposure.' We had no theory on why they were dying, though."

According to Hida, among victims of "city-entering radiation exposure," some died while others went on to live, albeit with various ailments.

Hida subsequently began union activities, and in 1950, opened his own clinic in Tokyo's Suginami Ward. He later relocated to neighboring Saitama Prefecture and worked as an internist, while serving from 1979 to 2009 as the chair of the Japan Confederation of A- and H-Bomb Sufferers Organizations' central consultation center.

During this time, atom bomb survivors flocked to see the rumored "radiation doctor." They always came in the evening, right before the Hida's clinic closed. They did not disclose at the reception desk that they had been exposed to radiation; Hida intuited from their behavior in the exam room that they were.

"Atom bomb survivors were at one time unable to take out life insurance policies. Countless survivors have been discriminated against in marriage, studies, employment, and other important life events," Hida writes in his book, "Naibu hibaku no kyoi" (The Threat of Internal Radiation Exposure). "This is inherited by the second (children's) generation, and the third generation . . . "

Hida, who had seen so many atomic bomb survivors forced to live lives at the bottom rungs of society, continued for years to pursue the medical mechanism for "city-entering radiation exposure." Some 30 years after the bombs had been dropped, Hida happened upon a paper about internal exposure written by an American researcher. Hida said he was dumbfounded when he read that many people affected by U.S.-run nuclear experiments had presented symptoms similar to bomb survivors in Japan. He then translated such papers into Japanese, and started speaking up about the dangers of internal radiation exposure in both Japan and abroad.

To his audience in Yokohama, Hida spoke about people who had survived direct damage from the bomb, but who after a few years were suffering from fatigue so intense that they could not sit up.

"They didn't bleed, their hair didn't fall out, they were suffering no visible ailments, and yet there were so many people claiming to be deathly exhausted. I'd examine them, and find nothing wrong. They were perceived to be lazy, and a patient's family member named it "bura-bura" (an onomatopoeia describing someone hanging out and doing nothing) disease.

Bura-bura patients were mostly healthy people prior to radiation exposure, but now become easily ill. They feel lethargic, which keep them from sticking to work. Doctors examining them can find nothing out of the ordinary, which is why many have been labeled by friends and family as lazy.

After the lecture, Hida added: "To put it simply, it's a generalized weakness in the body. You only have the patient's word, and it defies categorization under modern medicine, so a doctor might diagnose it not as a physical illness but as a neurosis. Recently, a researcher on the Chernobyl disaster in the former Soviet Union told me there's such a thing as "radiation fatigue" -- thus named because people who had been exposed to radiation from the incident were tired. The way I see it, it wouldn't be strange in the least if such symptoms were seen in Fukushima."

The study of the long-term effects of radiation from atomic bombs on the human body was begun by the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission (ABCC) established under President Harry Truman in 1947. The research base was relocated in 1975 to the Radiation Effects Research Foundation (RERF), run cooperatively by the Japanese and U.S. governments and located in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The research results from activities there are reflected in the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP)'s radiological consequence evaluation. RERF is now involved in investigating the health conditions of Fukushima Prefecture residents.

The ongoing study, which primarily addresses external radiation exposure, has been criticized from some researchers and victims' organizations for underestimating the risks of radiation exposure. Hida, meanwhile, has a theory on why no in-depth study of the internal radiation exposure of Hiroshima and Nagasaki bomb victims ever took place.

"If you kill someone in a war, you're not guilty of a crime. But if we were to acknowledge that all these years later, people continue to die from the effects of the war and the bombs, the very existence of nuclear weapons would be on tenuous ground, because it would be considered an inhumane weapon. I think therein lies the reason why various countries refuse to acknowledge internal radiation exposure." That is also probably why a causal relationship between radiation exposure and bura-bura disease has not yet been acknowledged.

Hida has spoken as a witness in lawsuits brought against the government by survivors seeking radiation sickness certification and benefits. He questions researchers' claims that lifetime total radiation exposure of less than 100 millisieverts has no known health effects. The theory is worlds apart from the reality that he has seen among his patients over the years.

"I've felt a sense of duty for having survived the war and the bomb by chance. For the many people who experienced the bombings, I've stood up against the occupation forces and the Japanese government, who others have often deferred to. I have this 'so what, I'm not doing anything wrong' attitude at the core."
http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnn...2a00m0na013000c.html

[This message has been edited by dennis_6 (edited 01-24-2012).]

quote Originally posted by phonedawgz: http://enenews.com/pbs-fron...rt-very-conservative http://video.pbs.org/program/frontline/

Prove Fukushima radiation is 10 percent of Chernobyl. All sources,not just air, and all isotopes. You can't trust the Soviet Unions estimates and Tepco has been altering their numbers up and down, whenever it suites them. If you don't have facts, its just opinion.

I consider this source at least as accurate as PBS state run media...

The Magnitude Of Fukushima Begins To Be Understood

October 28th, 2011 | Add a Comment
[Translate]

It was learned earlier this week that the air releases at Fukushima Daiichi were about double the original estimate of the Japanese government. The air estimates are about 42% of the releases at Chernobyl (these are cesium 137 only). The air estimate is 35,800 terabecquerels. This is only the air releases compared against total cesium releases at Chernobyl. Then there are the sea releases at Fukushima.

The sea releases are estimated at 27.1 petabecquerels or 27100 terabecquerels of cesium 137 by the French nuclear authority IRSN. They state that 82% of this sea release was done before April 8 as workers scrambled to cool the damaged reactors. These estimated amounts do not include any cesium 137 contained in water tanks, building basements or that is sunk into the ground. The total of the sea and air release estimates is 62900, leaving a 22338 terabecquerel difference between Fukushima and Chernobyl. Fukushima is still releasing radiation into the atmosphere on a daily basis though the amount being released has gone down.

35,800 Fukushima cesium air release terabecquerels

85238 Chernobyl cesium air release terabecquerels

27100 terabecquerels cesium sea release

Fukushima sea and air combined
62900 terabecquerels * these total combined releases are about 74% of Chernobyl

METI announced a 30 year estimate to decommission the plant. This includes decontamination, removal of spent fuel from pools and removal of the melted fuel from the reactor buildings, or wherever it is currently residing.

This new map by Yukio Hayakawa at Gunma university shows the scope of the radiation dispersal in Japan. NHK has also released a map of current radiation levels at a series of locations in Japan, this map updates with new readings. Meanwhile the city of Kashiwa struggles with the recently found hot spot. The local government says they don’t have the proper staff or resources to deal with contamination of that high of a level.
http://www.simplyinfo.org/?p=3787

[This message has been edited by dennis_6 (edited 01-24-2012).]

Wednesday, January 25, 2012
Thyroid Abnomalities in 0.7% of Fukushima Children, According to Prefectural Government

(Let's repeat the refrain: "It has nothing to do with radiation".)

From Jiji Tsushin (1/25/2012):

１８歳以下０．７％、５ミリ超のしこり＝放射線の影響「考えにくい」－福島県

0.7% of children under the age of 18 have developed lumps [on the thyroid] more than 5 millimeters in diamater: "Hard to believe" there is any effect of radiation, says Fukushima prefectural government

　福島県は２５日、東京電力福島第１原発事故の発生時に１８歳以下だった県内の子ども全員を対象とした甲状腺検査の先行調査の結果を初めて公表した。超音波検査を受けた３７６５人の� ��ち、０．７％に当たる２６人から５．１ミリ以上のしこりが見つかった。

On January 25, the Fukushima prefectural government announced for the first time the result of the early test of thyroid gland on the children who were in Fukushima Prefecture and were under the age of 18 at the time of the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant accident. Of 3765 children who were tested with ultrasound, 26 children or 0.7% of the children tested were found with lumps that measure more than 5.1 millimeters in diameter.

　検査を担当した福島県立医科大は「良性のしこりで、以前から存在していた可能性が高く、放射線の影響は考えにくい」としているが、念のために超音波や採血などの追加検査を行う。

Fukushima Medical University, who conducted the test, says, "They are benign lumps. It is highly likely that these lump had existed before, and it is hard to believe there is any effect of radiation". However, just in case, the university will conduct additional ultrasound testing and blood testing.

　先行調査の対象は事故当時に浪江町と飯舘村、川俣町山木屋地区に住んでいた子ども。２６人の大半は６歳以上で、がんの疑いがあるケースはなかったという。

The early test was done on children who lived in Namie-machi, Iitate-mura, and Yamakiya District of Kawamata-machi at the time of the accident. Most of the 26 children are over the age of 6, and according to the Fukushima prefectural government there was no case of suspected cancer.

Fukushima Medical University, as you recall, has Dr. Shunichi Yamashita as the vice president. He and his associates are responsible for telling the residents in Iitate-mura and other high radiation cities and towns in Fukushima that it was safe to be outside, to eat vegetables, to drink water, when the radioactive fallout was falling heavily in Fukushima in March and April.

Of course these lumps are benign. They have to be.
Posted by arevamirpal::laprimavera at 1:06 PM
Labels: radiation exposure for children, Shunichi Yamashita, thyroid

http://ex-skf.blogspot.com/...03-of-fukushima.html

US ex-diplomat pulls no punches on Japan

By Shaun Tandon (AFP) – 19 hours ago

WASHINGTON — US diplomats typically are unfailingly polite and reverential towards their countries of expertise and, upon retirement, go away quietly into research or business. Not so with Kevin Maher.

Since he was unceremoniously removed from his position last year, the veteran US diplomat on Japan has gone on the offensive with biting criticism on issues from Tokyo's political paralysis to the Fukushima nuclear disaster.

To his own surprise, he has found an eager audience. A book he wrote in Japanese, "The Japan That Can't Decide," has sold more than 100,000 copies and for weeks topped the country's best-seller list for non-fiction paperbacks.

Maher's main thesis is that Japan -- which has had six new prime ministers since 2006 -- has been crippled by a failure of its politicians to accept responsibility and, hence, to make hard decisions.

Maher pointed to the crisis at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant, which was devastated by the March 11 tsunami, and dismissed the government's declaration last month that it had stabilized the leaking reactors.

"It's not stable," Maher said recently at the Heritage Foundation in Washington. "Tokyo is safe, but Fukushima Daiichi is in really bad shape."

The State Department sacked Maher as its Japan desk chief just a day before the historic 9.0-magnitude earthquake but he stayed on for another month to coordinate the US disaster response.

Maher said that the US government was privately terrified over the unfolding crisis. He accused Japan's then prime minister, Naoto Kan, of evading responsibility and trying to pass the problem over to the plant's operator, the Tokyo Electric Power Co.

"I remember sitting on a task force many a time thinking, 'Who the hell is in control in Japan?' The government's not doing anything. Kan made one trip and flew up and got in the way and came back," Maher said.

Maher said that he watched in horror as he saw television footage of a sole helicopter dropping water on the stricken plant.

"Is that the best Japan can do?" Maher said. "Frankly what happened is the US government called in the Japanese ambassador and said, look, you have to take this stuff seriously. We don't know what's going to happen."

Maher said that the United States was even looking at whether it would have to evacuate some 100,000 Americans, although it soon became clear that Tokyo was not in harm's way.

Maher's earlier strident critiques led to his downfall. While in office, he spoke to students about Okinawa -- home to half of the 47,000 US troops in Japan -- and accused local leaders of playing on mainland Japanese guilt to "extort" concessions. Japanese media accounts of his remarks stirred outrage.

Maher, 57, who has worked on Japan for three decades and has a Japanese wife, called the controversy "water under the bridge" and said he was making a good living as a consultant.

Nonetheless, he criticized the two officials he said were behind his dismissal -- then deputy secretary of state Jim Steinberg and Ambassador to Japan John Roos.

"They just wanted to get this out of the press and decided that the best thing was not to address whether these press reports were actually true or not but just to remove me from my position," Maher said.

Despite his criticism, Maher -- like current US officials -- sees bright spots in Japan's latest prime minister, Yoshihiko Noda, who is pushing forward controversial plans to raise taxes and join talks on a US-backed trade pact.

Maher said he has received little backlash over his book. He believed he won over potentially hostile readers with a message that Japan worked well in the past and needed to return to its traditions.

"We used to have an image back in the '80s, if a Japanese corporation had a problem, you were worried that the chairman would go to commit seppuku," he said, referring to ritual suicide.

"He would take responsibility even if it was not a mistake that he made. But now it's reversed in Japan," he said.

Maher said he was surprised when he visited Okinawa to promote his book.

"There were four demonstrators. When I was consul general in Okinawa, I could always get 40."
http://www.google.com/hoste...828443311e0f2ec0.171

Japan warned of mass rescue in nuclear crisis
January 27, 2012


TOKYO: The Japanese government's worst-case scenario at the height of the nuclear crisis last year warned that tens of millions of people, including Tokyo residents, would need to leave their homes, according to a report obtained by the Associated Press. But fearing widespread panic, officials kept the report secret.

The recent emergence of the 15-page internal document may add to complaints in Japan that the government withheld too much information about the world's worst nuclear accident since Chernobyl.

It also casts doubt as to whether the government was prepared to cope with what could have been an evacuation of unprecedented scale.
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Under fire ... Naoto Kan.

Under fire ... Naoto Kan. Photo: Bloomberg

The report was submitted to the then prime minister Naoto Kan and his advisers on March 25, two weeks after the earthquake and tsunami devastated the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant, causing three reactors to melt down and generating hydrogen explosions that blew away protective structures.

Emergency workers ultimately were able to bring the reactors under control, but at the time, it was unclear whether emergency measures would succeed.

Mr Kan commissioned the report, compiled by the Atomic Energy Commission of Japan, to examine what options the government had if those efforts failed. Authorities evacuated 59,000 residents within 20 kilometres of the Fukushima plant, with thousands more were evacuated from other towns later. The report said there was a chance far larger evacuations could be needed.

The report looked at several ways the crisis could escalate: explosions inside the reactors, complete meltdowns and the structural failure of cooling pools for spent nuclear fuel.

It said each contingency was possible at the time it was written and could force all workers to flee, meaning the situation at the plant would unfold on its own, unmitigated.

Using matter-of-fact language, diagrams and charts, the report said if meltdowns spiralled out of control, radiation levels could soar.

In that case, it said evacuation orders should be issued for residents within a 17 kilometre radius of the plant and ''voluntary'' evacuations offered for everyone living within 250 kilometres.

That area would have included Tokyo and its suburbs, with a population of 35 million, and other large cities such as Sendai, with 1 million people, and Fukushima with 290,000 people.

The report further warned contaminated areas might not be safe for ''several decades''.

''We cannot rule out further developments that may lead to an unpredictable situation at Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear plant, where there has been an accident, and this report outlines a summary of that unpredictable situation,'' says the document, written by Shunsuke Kondo, head of the commission, which oversees nuclear policy.

After Mr Kan received the report, he and other Japanese officials publicly insisted there was no need to prepare for wider-scale evacuations.

The new Japanese government continues to refuse to make the document public.

The Associated Press obtained it on Wednesday through a government source, who insisted on anonymity because the document was still categorised as internal.

The cabinet minister in charge of the nuclear crisis, Goshi Hosono, implicitly acknowledged the document's existence earlier this month, but said the government had felt no need to make it public.

''It was a scenario based on hypothesis, and even in the event of such a development, we were told that residents would have enough time to evacuate,'' Mr Hosono said.

''We were concerned about the possibility of causing excessive and unnecessary worry if we went ahead and made it public. That's why we decided not to disclose it.''

Associated Press

Read more: http://www.smh.com.au/envir...z.html#ixzz1kbeRfLk6

[This message has been edited by dennis_6 (edited 01-26-2012).]

List of US criticality accidents, both military and civilian.

CRITICALITY ACCIDENTS

(from Operational Accidents and Radiation Exposure Experience Within the United States Atomic Energy Commission, 1943-1970, U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C., 1971.)

In the AEC's operational activities (not licensed) for the past 28 years there have been a total of 26 occasions (see Chart XV) when the power level of fissile systems became uncontrollable because of unplanned or unexpected changes in the system reactivity. On three occasions, the power excursions were planned; however, the fission energy released during the excursion was significantly larger than was expected. There have been a total of six deaths attributable to criticality accidents. The property damage resulting from these excursions has been approximately $4,455,000; however, 98% of the property loss was due to the SL-1 reactor excursion.

Further study of this accident record reveals that nine of the unplanned excursions occurred behind heavy shielding and three of them occurred in facilities remotely located with respect to personnel. Hence, the probability of injuries to people was reduced almost to the vanishing point. It is also noted that fourteen of the accidents occurred during experiments, six occurred in production or processing facilities, and five in reactor activities. In these laboratory, production, and reactor facilities there were, respectively, two, one, and three fatalities.

A review of these incidents has been made by W. R. Stratton, University of California, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, Los Alamos, N. Mex. All we have done below is to prepare a brief description of each incident.
CRITICALITY EXCURSION INCIDENT
Oak Ridge, Tenn., Jan. 30, 1968

Unexpected criticality was achieved in a volume of an aqueous solution of a salt of U235 during a series of routine critical experiments in progress in a well-shielded assembly area of a critical experiments facility. The criticality radiation alarm system functioned as designed, the evacuation of personnel from the building was prompt and orderly, and the excursion was terminated expeditiously by a negative coefficient of reactivity and was prevented from recurring by the action of the safety devices. The fission yield was 1.1 X 1016. Gamma-ray sensitive personnel dosimeters read immediately following the excursion showed no direct exposure greater than 5 mr to any person present. There was no property damage or loss of fissile materials. An estimated 100 cm, of solution (15 g of U) were spilled when a rubber-stoppered connection immediately above the sphere was dislocated.

The purpose of the particular experiment in progress was to establish the critical concentration of a sphere of the solution of uranyl nitrate surrounded by a thick water reflector. In the course of approaching criticality by incremental additions of solution, a small volume of air was observed entrapped in a flexible transparent tube. Supercriticality occurred during an attempt, by remote manipulation of liquid levels, to remove the air.
ACCIDENTAL CRITICALITY EXCURSION
Los Alamos, N. Mex., May 18, 1967

A nuclear excursion of 4 x 1016 fissions took place in the critical mockup of a high power density reactor. There was neither damage to the equipment nor significant exposure of persons; nevertheless, the incident indicated poor practice and an undesirable interpretation of operating procedures which has been corrected. The reactor mockup is fueled with elements composed of fully enriched uranium in a graphite matrix, and a smaller number of graphite moderating elements. This permits a relatively small core volume (250 liters). The core, housed in a graphite cylinder, drops out of its Be reflector for loading. Control and safety drums are within the annular reflector.

Before the incident, fuel along the core axis was replaced by additional moderating elements to investigate flux-trap effects. Instead of the usual step-wise interchange of elements, the entire moderating island was installed. Then, instead of stepwise multiplication measurements while inserting the core into the reflector, which is proper for initial approaches to criticality, there were no measurements during interrupted insertion. It had been inferred from the behavior of different moderating elements in an earlier mockup that the overall reactivity change would be minor. This was a serious mistake, for the actual change proved to be about $10. Before complete closure was achieved, a very short period and scram (dropping the core and actuating the safety drums) occurred.
NUCLEAR EXCURSION AND FIRE
Livermore, Calif., Mar. 26, 1963

A nuclear excursion and subsequent fire took place during a subcritical experiment in a shielded vault designed for critical assembly experiments. The excursion was estimated at 4 X 1017 fissions and was followed by oxidation of the enriched uranium metal in the assembly.

The cause of the excursion is believed to have been directly attributable to mechanical failure.

The total property loss was $94,881.
NUCLEAR EXCURSION
Richland, Wash., Apr. 7, 1962

An unplanned nuclear excursion occurred in a plutonium processing facility because of the inadvertent accumulation of approximately 1500 grams of plutonium in 45-50 liters of dilute nitric acid solution in a 69-liter glass transfer tank. The sequence of events which led to the accumulation of the plutonium the tank cannot be stated positively. However, it is believed that, when a tank valve was opened, the solution from another process vessel overflowed to a sump and was drawn into the transfer tank through a temporary line between this tank and the sump.

When the excursion occurred, radiation and evacuation alarms sounded. All but three employees left the building immediately, according to well-prepared and -rehearsed evacuation plans. Fortunately, they were not in close proximity to the involved system nor in a high radiation field.

The course of the nuclear reaction involved initial criticality (1016 fissions); a subsidence; one or more later peaks; and after approximately one-half hour, a declining rate of fission, which terminated in a subcritical condition 37 hours later. The total number of fissions was approximately 8 X 1017.

Of the 22 persons in the building at the time, only four employees, those who were in the room with the system, were hospitalized for observation. Three of them were the system operators, who were in close proximity to the excursion, and who received estimated radiation doses of 110, 43 and 19 rem. None of them showed symptoms definitely referable to their radiation exposures. The fourth was sent to the hospital only because he was in the room at the time of the incident.

Some fission product activity, airborne via the vent system and the exhaust stack, was detected in the atmosphere for a brief period after the accident. The physical damage amounted to less than $1,000. (See TID-5360, Suppl. 4, page 17.)
NUCLEAR EXCURSION
Oak Ridge, Tenn., Nov. 10, 1961

A criticality excursion occurred as enriched uranium metal, neutron-reflected and -moderated by hydrogen, was being assembled. The excursion was caused by a too rapid approach of the two pieces of metal used in the experiment.

There was no personnel exposure or property damage. The energy release was estimated to be between 1015 and 1016 fissions. Fission product contamination, both airborne and contained in the metal, decayed sufficiently overnight to allow unhindered continuation of the experiment.

The incident occurred in a critical experiment laboratory specifically designed to accommodate such occurrences, since events of this nature cannot be considered entirely unexpected in an experimental facility of this sort. (See TID-5360. Suppl. 4, p. 14.)
CRITICALITY ACCIDENT
Idaho Falls, Idaho, Jan. 25, 1961

A nuclear excursion of approximately 6 X 1017 fissions occurred in a first-cycle product evaporator at a chemical processing plant. The criticality accident resulted when a solution of enriched uranyl nitrate accidentally surged from a geometrically safe section of the evaporator into the upper critically unsafe, vapor disengagement section. The accident occurred behind thick concrete walls in a processing cell which is part of the first cycle for processing highly radioactive spent-fuel elements.

Personnel response to the radiation alarms and the evacuation signal was prompt and orderly.

Analyses of badges from 65 individuals indicated a maximum exposure of 55 millirem gamma and 0 beta. The maximum thermal neutron exposure detected in the badges analyzed was less than 10 millirem. Analyses of nuclear accident dosimeters indicated that there was negligible fast neutron flux associated with personnel exposures.

The radioactivity released to the atmosphere as a result of the accident was about twice normal background when it left the area. Loss of $6,000 resulted from cleanup of the, incident. (See TID-5360, Suppl. 4, p. 9; 1961 Nuclear Safety, Vol. 3, #2, p. 71.)
SL-1 EXCURSION
Idaho Falls, Idaho, Jan. 3, 1961

A nuclear excursion occurred within the reactor vessel, resulting in extensive damage of the reactor core and room, and in high radiation levels (approximately 500-1,000 rem/hr) within the reactor room.

At the time of the accident, a three-man crew was on the top of the reactor assembling the control rod drive mechanisms and housing. The nuclear excursion, which resulted in an explosion, was caused by manual withdrawal, by one or more, of the maintenance crew, of the central control rod blade from the core considerably beyond the limit specified in the maintenance procedures.

Two members of the crew were killed instantly by the force of the explosion, and the third man died within two hours following the incident as a result of an injury to the head. Of the several hundred people engaged in recovery operations, 22 persons received radiation exposures in the range of three to 27 rem gamma radiation total-body exposure. The maximum whole-body beta radiation was 120 rem.

Some gaseous fission products, including radioactive iodine, escaped to the atmosphere outside the building and were carried downwind in a narrow plume. Particulate fission material was largely confined to the reactor building, with slight radioactivity in the immediate vicinity of the building.

The total property loss was $4,350,000. (See TlD-5360, Suppl. 4, p. 8; 1962 Nuclear Safety. Vol. 3, #3, p. 64.)
CRITICALITY INCIDENT
Idaho Falls, Idaho, Oct. 16, 1959

A nuclear incident occurred in a process equipment waste collection tank when an accidental transfer was made of about 200 liters of uranyl nitrate solution, containing about 34 kilograms of enriched uranium (91 percent U235), from safe process storage tanks to a geometrically unsafe tank through a line formerly used for waste transfers.

Limited visual inspections and test that no significant, property damage or loss resulted beyond the approximately $60,000 cost to recover contaminated uranium solution resulting from the incident.

Of the 21 personnel directly involved in this incident, seven received external exposures to radiation. The exposures were 8, 6, 3.95, 1.50, 1.38, 1.17, and 1.17 rem. Two individuals also received external exposures to the skin of 50 rem and 32 rem. No medical treatment was required for the 21 personnel involved. (See TID-5360, Suppl. 3, p. 14; USAEC Serious Accidents Issue #163, 4-18-60.)
FATAL INJURY ACCOMPANIES CRITICALITY ACCIDENT
Los Alamos, N. Mex., Dec. 30, 1958

The chemical operator introduced what was believed to be a dilute plutonium solution from one tank into another known to contain more plutonium in emulsion. Solids containing plutonium were probably washed from the bottom of the first tank with nitric acid and the resultant mixture of nitric acid and plutonium-bearing solids was added to the tank containing the emulsion. A criticality excursion occurred immediately after starting the motor to a propeller type stirrer at the bottom of the second tank.

The operator fell from the low stepladder on which he was standing and stumbled out of the door into the snow. A second chemical operator in an adjoining room had seen a flash, which probably resulted from a short circuit when the motor to the stirrer started, and went to the man's assistance. The accident victim mumbled he felt as though he was burning up. Because of this, it was assumed that there had been a chemical accident with a probable acid or plutonium exposure. There was no realization that a criticality accident had occurred for a number of minutes. The quantity of plutonium which actually was present in the tank was about ten times more than was supposed to be there at any time during the procedure.

The employee died 35 hours later from the effects of a radiation exposure with the whole-body dose calculated to be 12,000 rem +.

Two other employees received radiation exposures of 134 and 53 rem, respectively. Property damage was negligible. (See TID-5360, Suppl 2, p. 30; USAEC Serious Accidents Issue #143, 1-22-59.)
NUCLEAR EXCURSION
Oak Ridge, Tenn., June 16, 1958

A nuclear accident occurred in a 55-gallon stainless steel drum in a processing area in which enriched uranium is recovered from various materials by chemical methods in a complex of equipment. This recovery process was being remodeled at the time of the accident.

The incident occurred while they were draining material thought to be water from safe 5-inch storage pipes into an unsafe drum.

Eight employees were in the vicinity of the drum carrying out routine plant operations and maintenance. A chemical operator was participating in the leak testing which inadvertently set off the reaction. He was within three to six feet of the drum, while the other seven employees were from 15 to 50 feet away.

Using special post hoc methods for determining the neutron and gamma exposures of the employees involved, it was estimated that the eight men received: 461 rem, 428 rem, 413 rem, 341 rem, 298 rem, 86 rem, 86 rem, and 29 rem.

Area contamination was slight, with decontamination costs amounting to less than $1,000.

During this incident 1.3 X 1018 fissions occurred. (See TID-5360, Suppl. 2, p. 25; USAEC Serious Accidents Issue #136, 8-25-59; USAEC Health and Safety Information Issue # 82, 9-5-58; 1959 Nuclear Safety, Vol. 1, #2, p. 59.)
GODIVA EXCURSION
Los Alamos, N. Mex., Feb. 12, 1957

[Godiva Reactor replica photo]The "Godiva" assembly was to be used to irradiate uranium-loaded graphite samples. The samples were to be heated in a shielded furnace, exposed to a "prompt" burst of neutrons and then transferred to a counter for evaluation. The experiments are conducted at an isolated site in a building separated from the control room and all personnel by about a quarter of a mile.

On the occasion of the accident, preliminary bursts were being produced. In the process of lowering the top safety block, an unexpected burst occurred that was estimated to have produced 1.2 X 1017 fissions. The energy was great enough to tear the uranium parts from the assembly, knocking one to the floor, and to distort the steel rods in the frame. The uranium was deformed and there was much more surface oxidation than usual.

There were no personal injuries or overexposures. No gamma radiation above background was detected outside the reactor building. Radiation levels in the building were high initially . . . seven roentgens per hour gamma just inside the door (12' from Godiva) and 5,000 to 20,000 counts per minute (per 55 cm2 probe) alpha on horizontal surfaces about the room; therefore cleanup procedures were delayed 2-1/2 days until they could be completed without unnecessary exposure to cleanup personnel.

The total property loss was estimated at $2,400.

(See TID-5360, Suppl. 2, p. 18; USAEC Health and Safety Information Issue #75, 1-8-58.)
HONEYCOMB EXCURSION
Los Alamos, N. Mex., July 3, 1956

Too rapid assembly caused the system to become promptly critical. The burst yield was 3.2 X 1016 fissions.

There were no radiation exposures nor any property damage as a result of the incident.
EXPERIMENTAL REACTOR
Oak Ridge, Tenn., Feb. 1, 1956

A homogenous UO2F2, water-moderated critical assembly was made prompt critical by an overaddition of fuel to the assembly. Before reaching the critical point, the hand-operated valve was turned off. However, fuel continued to be added to the reactor because of air pressure in the line. Although the automatic safety system operated, assuring termination of the burst, considerable fuel was displaced from the reactor. The number of fissions in the burst was estimated to be about 1.6 X 1017.

No serious exposures resulted, since all personnel were shielded by a minimum of five feet of concrete. There was no significant property damage and all uranium was recovered. (See TID-5360, Suppl. 1, p. 5.)
CORE MELTDOWN
Idaho Falls, Idaho, Nov. 29, 1955

The Experimental Breeder Reactor (EBR-I) was undergoing a series of experiments.

Without modification, certain safety instrumentation. would not permit the conduct of the experiment; therefore, reliance was placed on manual control to shut down the reactor.

During an experiment, the scientist in charge told the operator to press the "emergency reactor off" button. This would have instantaneously removed sufficient reactivity. Owing to a misunderstanding, the operator began by withdrawing the control rods at normal speed. This allowed the reactor to reach a higher power than anticipated and resulted in consequent melting of the fuel elements.

Shortly after the accident, there was a rise in the radiation level in the building. The building was evacuated. There were no personnel injuries. There was minor contamination of the sodium potassium coolant. (See TID-5360, p. 30.)
BORAX 1 EXPLOSION
Idaho Falls, Idaho, July 22, 1954

Destruction of the Borax I Reactor released 135 MW-sec of fission energy.

More than 200 safety experiments were made on the Borax I Reactor simulating control rod accidents. For the last test, conditions were set up so that the reactor would be run to destruction.

The tests were carried out by withdrawing four of the five control rods far enough to make the reactor critical at a very low power level. The fifth rod was then fired from the core by means of a spring. In this test, the rod was ejected in approximately 0.2 seconds. After the control rod was ejected, an explosion took place in the reactor which carried away the control mechanism and blew out the core. At half a mile, the radiation level rose to 25 mr/hr. Personnel were evacuated for about 30 minutes.

No one was injured and the destruction of the reactor was part of the cost of the experiment. (See TID-5360, p. 29.)
EXCURSION IN AN ENRICHED URANIUM WATER SOLUTION
Oak Ridge, Tenn., May 26, 1954

The experiment in progress at the time of the incident was one in a series designed to study criticality conditions of uranium-water solutions in annular cylindrical containers.

The cause of the accident was a. displacement of the central tube, effectively a poison rod, to a region of less importance. This displacement resulted from a dislocation of the positioning spider by a pin, used to connect sections of the liquid level indicator rack, protruding beyond the side of the rack and engaging a leg of the spider as the indicator was raised. Removing the compressional force from the top of the central tube allowed it to fall against the inside of the 10-inch cylinder. Although the displacement was small, it was sufficient to cause a large increase in the effective neutron multiplication.

The safety system apparently operated normally and the reaction was stopped automatically. All personnel in the building during the incident, were protected by a minimum of five feet of concrete shielding; therefore, no serious exposures were incurred. (See TID-5360, p. 18.)
SUPERCRITICALITY EXPERIMENT
Los Alamos, N. Mex., Feb. 3, 1954

The incident occurred in the course of an extensive study of the properties of supercritical radiation bursts produced by an assembly of fissionable metal. This study was covered by a specific procedure. A reference check of critical conditions preceded each supercritical burst.

To attain rapidly sufficient power for a delayed critical check, it was customary to set control rods at the position of minimum reactivity and insert a reactivity booster in the form of a fissionable metal slug. This time, when the booster was inserted, radiation indicators and the assembly temperature recorded went offscale (to return in a few minutes), and scrams were actuated. The resulting shock separated parts of the assembly and damaged steel supporting members.

There was no injury. The property loss was an expenditure of $600 for repair of the assembly. (See TID-5360, p. 9.)
SUDDEN INCREASE IN REACTIVITY DURING CONTROL ROD TESTS
Lemont, Ill., June 2, 1952

Manual withdrawal of a control rod from a. critical assembly caused an accidental supercriticality.

The operation being conducted was the comparison of a series of newly-manufactured control rods. The assembly had been operated with the standard control rod. It was then shut down by inserting all control rods and draining the water moderator, a, standard safe method of shutting down the assembly when core changes are to be made. The standard rod was removed and the first of the series of control rods to be tested was inserted.

The assembly was filled with water with the test control rod fully in and the standard type control rods fully inserted. Withdrawal of one of the standard control rods 32 centimeters caused the assembly to become critical and the power was leveled off while the desired measurements were made. The control rod was then reinserted into the original "in" position.

With the water still in the assembly, the four members of the crew then went into the assembly room for the purpose of replacing the control rod which they had just tested. The group leader went up on the platform, reached out with his right hand and started to pull out the tested rod. As soon as he had withdrawn it about one foot, the center of the assembly emitted a bluish glow and a large bubble formed. Simultaneously, there was a muffled explosive noise. The group leader let go of the control rod which he was removing and it fell back into position. The crew left the assembly room immediately and went to the control room.

Four employees received radiation exposures ranging from 12 to 190 rem. (See TID-5360, p. 23.)
CRITICALITY RESULTS FROM ERROR IN CALCULATIONS
Los Alamos, N. Mex., Apr. 18, 1952

Two stacks of fissionable disks were being built up stepwise to give a slightly subcritical assembly with the two stacks brought together by remote control. The individual stacks were built up by hand in fixed assemblies and the two stacks brought together only by remote mechanisms.

After two members of the operating crew calculated erroneously from previous steps that one more disk could be added safely, the disk was added and, with attempted caution, the system was assembled remotely. Radiation indicators went offscale, actuating scrams, neutron counters jammed, and a puff of smoke was observed on the television viewer. Within three to five minutes indicators and counters returned to operating ranges.

There was no injury, no loss of material, no damage to facilities, and negligible loss of operating time. (See TID-5360, p. 7.)
EXCURSION IN A PLUTONIUM NITRATE SOLUTION
Richland, Wash., Nov. 16, 1951

Upon completion of volume measurements, it was thought that some additional information as to the required dilution could be determined by finding where criticality might occur on the rods. The control rod was pulled first with very minor reactivity effect. Following this, the safety rod was withdrawn intermittently at high speed (2.3"/sec). A waiting period for the delayed neutron effect of about 15 seconds was made just prior to the incident. This was too short a time to determine whether or not the assembly was critical. The operators next heard the safety controls actuate, instrument indicators moved offscale, scalers jammed, and the most startling manifestation was that of the breakdown of "counters" playing back through the public address system. The portable "Juno" in the control room was offscale. Presumably, a further rod withdrawal had been made.

There were no injuries. The building was successfully decontaminated, except for the test room and assembly. Before decontamination of this area was completed, a fire occurred and, subsequently, the building was abandoned because of the respread of contamination. (See TID-5360, p. 14.)
SCRAM MECHANISM CAUSES CRITICALITY
Los Alamos, N. Mex., Mar. 20, 1951

Interactions between two masses of fissionable material in water were measured at progressively decreasing horizontal separations. Remotely controlled operations established the desired horizontal separation of the two components and flooded the system.

After the final measurement, the system was "scrammed" (a rapid disassembly mechanism was actuated). Safety monitor indicators went offscale, neutron counters jammed, and the television viewer indicated steaming. Within a few minutes, indicators and counters returned to operating ranges and indicated a rapid decay of radiation.

There was no injury, no loss of material, and no damage to facilities. (See TlD-5360, p. 13.)
CRITICALITY DURING CONTROL ROD TESTS
Los Alamos, N. Mex., December 1949

The reactor was being remodeled for higher power operation. As part of the required alterations, two new control rods had been placed in the system in addition to the three existing control rods.

The employee who had built the rod control mechanism wanted to test the comparative fall times of these new rods. He opened the enclosure on top of the reactor and manually lifted the rods, neglecting the possibility that this would affect the reactivity of the reactor because of its higher power arrangement. Heretofore, the three existing rods were sufficient for safety.

Normally, rods are raised remotely from the control room when the control panel is activated by a key switch. Since the rods were pulled out manually with the panel being off, no equipment was turned on except a direct reading temperature meter. Therefore, there were no neutron sensitive devices to record or warn of a rise in the neutron level. It was not observed until after the incident that the reactor temperature had risen about 25 centigrade.

The removal of the two rods probably gave a delta-K of about 0.86 percent, producing an initial period of about 0.16 second. Since the measured temperature coefficient is approximately 0.034 percent k/C, the observed temperature rise indicates the rods were out sufficiently long so that the reactor was stopped by the negative temperature coefficient.

There were no injuries. The employee doing the work received 2.5 rem of gamma radiation according to his film badge. There was no damage done to the reactor and no loss of active material. (See TID-5360, p. 21.)
INADVERTENT SUPERCRITICALITY RESULTS IN DEATH
Los Alamos, N. Mex., May 21, 1946

[Slotin Accident Illustration]A senior scientist [Louis Slotin] was demonstrating the technique of critical assembly and associated studies and measurements to another scientist. The particular technique employed in the demonstration was to bring a hollow hemisphere of beryllium around a mass of fissionable material which was resting in a similar lower hollow hemisphere.

The system was checked with two one-inch spacers between the upper hemisphere and the lower shell which contained the fissionable material; the system was subcritical at this time.

Then the spacers were removed so that one edge of the upper hemisphere rested on the lower shell while the other edge of the upper hemisphere was supported by a screwdriver. This latter edge was permitted to approach the lower shell slowly. While one hand held the screwdriver, the other hand was holding the upper shell with the thumb placed in an opening at the polar point.

At that time, the screwdriver apparently slipped and the upper shell fell into position around the fissionable material. Of the eight people in the room, two were directly engaged in the work leading to this incident.

The "blue glow" was observed, a heat wave felt, and immediately the top shell was slipped off and everyone left the room. The scientist who was demonstrating the experiment received sufficient dosage to result in injuries from which he died nine days later. The scientist assisting received sufficient radiation dosage to cause serious injuries and some permanent partial disability.

The other six employees in the room suffered no permanent injury. (See TID-5360, p. 4.)
FATALITY FROM CRITICAL MASS EXPERIMENTS
Los Alamos, N. Mex., Aug. 21, 1945

During the process of making critical mass studies and measurements, an employee [Harry Daghlian] working in the laboratory at night alone (except for a guard seated 12 feet away) was stacking blocks of tamper material around a mass of fissionable material.

As the assembly neared a, critical configuration, the employee was lifting one last piece of tamper material which was quite heavy. As this piece neared the setup, the instrument indicated that fission multiplication would be produced, and as the employee moved his hand to set the block at a distance from the pile, he dropped the block, which landed directly on top of the setup.

A "blue glow" was observed and the employee proceeded to disassemble the critical material and its tamper. In doing so, he added heavily to the radiation dosage to his hands and arms.

The employee received sufficient radiation dosage to result in injuries from which he died 28 days later.

The guard suffered no permanent injury. (See TID-5360, p. 2.)
UNANTICIPATED CRITICALITY IN WATER-SHIELDED ASSEMBLY
Los Alamos, N. Mex., June 4, 1945

An experiment was designed to measure the critical mass of enriched uranium when surrounded by hydrogenous material. The enriched uranium was in the form of cast blocks of the metal, 1/2" X 1/2" X 1/2" and 1/2" X 1/2" X 1". The blocks were stacked in a pseudospherical arrangement in 12 courses in a 6" X 6" X 6" polyethylene box. The voids in the courses were filled with polyethylene blocks of appropriate dimensions. The polyethylene box was supported by a 2-foot-high stool within a 3-foot cubical steel tank. The tank had a 2-inch opening in the bottom through which it could be filled and drained by means of supply and drain hoses attached to a 3/4-inch tee. The opening in the tank was fitted with a shutoff valve, as was the drain hose. A polonium-beryllium source of about 200 mc strength was placed on top of the assembly. A fission chamber and a boron proportional counter were used to follow the experiment.

The immediate supervisor was absent from the scene when the experiment was begun. According to one of the operators, the water level was raised above the polonium-beryllium source with the supply valve almost fully open. At this point, a slight increase counting rate was observed, which corresponded with what had been observed previously when the source alone was immersed in water. A few seconds later, the counting rate began to increase at an alarming rate.

At this point, the supervisor returned, walked to within three feet of the tank and noted a blue glow surrounding the box. Simultaneously, the two operators were hastily closing the supply valve and opening the drain valve. The building was evacuated.

The three individuals involved received excessive radiation exposures, estimated in two cases as about 66.5 rem, and in the third as 7.4 rem. The doses delivered to the head and neck of these individuals may have been considerably greater. They were hospitalized for observation, but no untoward symptoms appeared. No significant changes in blood counts were observed, and sperm counts on one occasion, sometime after the incident, were normal. It is not believed that the individuals concerned received any significant radiation damage. There was no damage to equipment, no loss of active material, and no local contamination problem. (See TID-5360, p. 10.)
DRAGON REACTOR EXCURSION
Los Alamos, N. Mex., Feb. 11, 1945

This was the first reactor designed to generate prompt power excursions. Prompt critical was obtained by dropping a slug of UH3 in styrex through a vertical hole in a small assembly of the same material, which was diluted with polyethylene and reflected by graphite and polyethylene. Near the end of the planned sequence of burst of increasing power, a 6 X 1015 fission burst blistered and swelled the small cubes comprising the assembly matrix. No material was lost, there was no contamination, and there were no exposures.
http://www.cddc.vt.edu/host...cident/critical.html

quote Originally posted by phonedawgz: Wrong again "Today in 1961, the United States experienced the first nuclear power plant accident in the nation's history. Because of it, the design of both military and civilian reactors changed

Did you not read this? Duh.
As for 3 mile island, read what I posted again, slowly. Maybe it will sink into your thick skull.

[This message has been edited by dennis_6 (edited 01-27-2012).]